The Crisis of Rome Page 4

  The Tribunate of Ti. Sempronius Gracchus (133 BC)

  This period of tribunician activity hit a peak in 133 BC, with the election of Ti. Sempronius Gracchus. His tribunate remains one of the most contentious and written about periods of Roman history and whilst there is neither the space, nor the scope to do more than highlight some key themes, there exist a number of good works on the subject (see bibliography).

  Ti. Sempronius Gracchus hailed from one of Rome’s most distinguished plebeian aristocratic families. His father had been twice consul and censor,63 his mother was the daughter of Scipio Africanus and his father in law was Ap. Claudius Pulcher, the Princeps Senatus.64 His tribunate and subsequent murder at the end of his term of office marked the first death as a result of a domestic political struggle and many say ushered in a new era of violence in Roman domestic politics.65

  The root cause of his death and the controversy was a law he passed which set a limit on the amount of public land (ager publicus) a man could hold, with a confiscation of any of this type of land over the limit and its distribution to the poorer landless citizens.66 It is said to have been similar in type to the law proposed (and subsequently dropped) by C. Laelius a few years earlier and allegedly harked back to ancient statues in the limits of ager publicus a man could hold.67

  Gracchus’ stated motives, which have been the focus of scholarly argument for over 2,000 years, were that he was motivated by his awareness of the growing problem of Roman citizens losing their farms due to extended military service, leading to the twin problems of there being less available manpower and an increase in slaves. It is alleged that the citizens who lost their farms were selling them to rich landowners who amalgamated them into super-estates run by slaves, whilst the landless citizens were moving into the city. By virtue of their being landless then they were not eligible for military recruitment, as the law stated that a man must possess a certain amount of land to be eligible to fight for Rome. The argument being that Roman tradition believed that a man with land fought harder for his country than a man without, being little better than a mercenary (see Appendix III).

  Thus, it was argued that Gracchus’ law was aimed at getting the citizens out of the city and a life of dependency, back onto the land, thus making them eligible for military recruitment (which, it must be pointed out, would only start the cycle of extended service, neglect of farm, sale and city dwelling all over again). Furthermore, it would reduce Rome’s dependence on vast slave estates, which brought with it the threat of slave rebellions. Given that his tribunate in 133 coincided with the First Servile War in Sicily (see above), we can understand that this was a palpable fear.

  This ager publicus itself was a special category of Roman land, whose ultimate ownership rested with the state. During the earlier centuries when Rome extended her rule throughout Italy, a portion of land was usually confiscated by Rome from the defeated Italian states. The land was owned by the Roman state itself and rented out to various interested parties to farm it, with the title remaining in public hands. Naturally, over the decades and centuries, many of the families which owned this land came to view it as a hereditary possession, despite the state being the ultimate owner.

  Under Gracchus’ law all ancient ager publicus would be assessed by a threeman commission and each owner limited to 500 iugera (slightly higher than an acre), plus an extra 250 iugera for any sons (up to a limit of two). The commission was composed of himself, his younger brother and his father in law.68

  Naturally enough, there were going to be a number of prominent landowners who would lose land which they considered to be theirs by right of inheritance, even though they had no legal title to it. Furthermore, the three-man board and the whole issue did carry the trace of political factionalism and Tiberius himself would certainly have benefited from it in terms of public popularity.69 For these reasons it was not surprising that the law was opposed in both the Senate and the assemblies by some of his fellow tribunes.

  If the law itself was controversial then Tiberius’ methods only inflamed the situation. Facing opposition in the Senate, he did not present the law to them, but took it straight to the assemblies, which, although constitutionally legal, was against the accepted tradition and a clear snub to the Senate. When faced with the veto of a fellow tribune, rather than see if it could be argued out70, he had his fellow tribune, M. Octavius, deposed from office by popular vote, claiming that he was betraying his office by preventing a measure which clearly benefited the people.71 This was perhaps the most outrageous step Tiberius took, claiming a theory of popular sovereignty, which had no precedent. Although in theory the assemblies could vote out a tribune, it had never been done and undermined centuries of Roman constitutional practice.

  Tiberius followed this by going yet further. When the Senate voted his commission insufficient funds to carry out its task, he then sequestered monies from the recent bequest of Pergamum in the will of Attalus III, thus completely encroaching on the Senate’s prerogative to decide on foreign affairs. Given these actions, it is easy to see why so many in the Senate were opposed to Gracchus, including many who, given more reasonable actions, would have supported his proposals. For many the final straw came when Tiberius stood for re-election to the tribunate for 132 BC. Such a move was highly contentious and had not been done in 200 years, since the (in)famous tribunates of Licinius & Sextius in the fourth century.72 This would allow Tiberius to be elected for a second year in succession and prevent him from prosecution for any of his acts (for that additional year).

  To many in the Senate, this represented a dangerous situation and, fearful of his intentions, a mob of Senators attacked Gracchus and his supporters at the elections and lynched them. It is said that Tiberius was killed by P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica, the chief pontiff of Rome (the Pontifex Maximus).73 The years that followed saw a continuation of this factionalism, with a number of Tiberius’ supporters being put on trial for their support of the dead man, combined with a popular backlash against his murderers.

  As noted above, Scipio Nasica was sent to Pergamum to deal with the bequest, but died soon after. Scipio Aemilianus, who had been in Numantia throughout this year when he heard of the news, famously quoted Homer, ‘So perish all who commit such wickedness’, even though he was married to Tiberius’ sister.74 By 129 BC, the rift caused by Tiberius’ murder continued, with a number of tribunes voicing their support for his actions.75 The year was notable for the mysterious death of Scipio Aemilianus himself, who was found dead in his bed the morning he was due to advocate measures limiting the powers of the Gracchan land commissioners.76 At the time everything from murder to suicide was advanced as theory behind his death and certainly murder was widely suspected.

  The Tribunates of C. Sempronius Gracchus (123–122 BC)

  Thus we can see the atmosphere that formed the backdrop of the Roman political scene throughout the years that followed 133 BC. Another shadow hung over Roman politics in this period, namely Tiberius’ younger brother Caius, widely expected to take up his brother’s cause. Caius did not disappoint, being elected as tribune in both 123 and again in 122 BC. Throughout the two years he produced a raft of legislation with far wider aims than his brother. Again the chronology of these measures is confused, as are some of the measures themselves.

  In terms of the land issue, he re-issued his brother’s law of 133, which was probably more symbolic than meaningful, but went further by proposing a programme of founding new colonies, including one on the site of Carthage itself (Iunonia).77 More direct military issues were tackled with laws that provided clothing and equipment for legionaries at public expense rather than the soldier’s own (though again this may have been more a case of formalizing existing practice, and will be discussed later, in Appendix II). A further law barred the recruitment of young men under the age of seventeen.78 Caius also passed a law stating that all consular provinces must be named in advance of the election, to stop the Senate manipulating consular commands to favour certain individu
als. He also introduced the right to collect the taxes in the province of Asia being auctioned off to the business community, favouring the equestrian order of businessmen. Another notable measure was the issuing of corn, the staple diet of an average Roman citizen, to the inhabitants of Rome, at a subsidized rate.79

  Following his re-election for 122, which passed remarkably smoothly considering the issues it had raised when his brother attempted it, he widened his scope and attempted a more lasting alteration of the balance of Roman politics. He passed a law allowing all juries in corruption trials to be drawn from the equestrian order, reducing senatorial influence over the outcomes and ensuring equestrian corruption was dealt with sympathetically. He then proposed extending the franchise of Roman citizenship throughout Italy, in stages.80 Both measures would have extended Caius’ powerbase and raised issues that were not to be solved until decades later, perhaps not until the Principate itself. He clearly favoured the equestrian businessmen, themselves not an altogether separate class from the senatorial elite, by his measures on the Asian taxes and juries.81 Perhaps his most fundamental issue was his raising the prospect of extending the Roman citizenship franchise throughout Italy (albeit in a controlled manner), which was a Pandora’s Box not dealt with until the Social War and the censorship of 70 BC.

  Thus Caius went far beyond his brother’s scope in terms of legislation. Again scholars have spent two millennia arguing over his motives, but the scope of these laws and proposals shows a desire to alter the shape of the Roman political landscape in a remarkably short period of time. It is equally clear that many of those who stood to benefit from these proposals would back him personally as well. In response, the Senate initially adopted a more measured approach and set about undermining his support, certainly within Rome itself.

  One of Caius’ fellow tribunes of 122, M. Livius Drusus, proposed his own programme of colony foundation, on a reduced scale and vetoed the measures on extending the citizenship throughout Italy.82 On this occasion there was no resultant deposition of Drusus, perhaps as the urban populace of Rome were not enamoured with the prospects of sharing citizenship rights with the inhabitants of Italy. Thus Drusus presented a more subtle opposition to Caius and not one that could easily be dismissed. Furthermore, Caius spent a period time out of Rome, organizing the foundation of Iunonia on the site of Carthage and clearly suffered in popularity on his return.83 The obvious sign of this decline was his failure to be elected for a third consecutive tribunate, for 121 BC.

  With Caius no longer a tribune, the Senate made a move in 121, via a compliant tribune (Minucius Rufus), to annul some of his previous legislation.84 When the day came for the measure to be passed Caius and his supporters protested at the assembly, during which a servant of the Consul L. Opimius was killed. Opimius was a noted opponent of Gracchus and used this death to argue that Caius was attempting an armed sedition, a charge levelled against his brother. On this occasion, rather than resort to a religiously-sanctioned lynching, the Senate, at Opimius’ behest, passed a unique piece of legislation known as the senatus consultum ultimum (the ultimate/final decree of the Senate), equivalent to the Riot Act in Great Britain, or Martial Law; a suspension of the usual laws and the rights of the individual. Caius and his supporters were then hunted down and murdered, legally, though that can have been of little comfort to those involved.85

  Thus the 120s saw another round of state-sanctioned murder, this time veiled in a legal framework. These murders form the backdrop to the period in question and highlight the divisive nature that reform, political, agrarian or military, had taken. The decade that followed Caius Gracchus’ death repeated the pattern of the early 120s, with individual tribunes taking up the Gracchan cause (as it had become). Further agrarian laws were seen, the latest being in 111 BC, all of which amended Tiberius’ original proposals in some way. A notable tribune of this period was a certain C. Marius who was tribune in 119 and tapped into this atmosphere (see Chapter 7). It was in such a febrile atmosphere as this that key decisions were taken with regard to the Jugurthine Wars.

  Chapter 2 (206–112BC)

  The Rise of Numidia

  In 112 BC the Senate and People of Rome found themselves having to declare war on an allied African prince. The war that followed dragged on for seven years, confounded all expectations of an easy victory and exposed crucial military and political failings within the Roman Republican system. Yet, as always there is a danger of viewing the war from a one-sided (Roman) perspective. Even the most common name assigned to this conflict, the Bellum Iugurthinum,86 or Jugurthine War can obscure important longer-term factors. From ancient times onwards, many historians have viewed this war as unforeseen and a result of an accidental set of circumstances. Indeed, this is probably how many in the Senate at the time saw it, especially as its immediate causes were to be found in a succession dispute between the princes of an African kingdom. It is perhaps Florus who, writing some 200 years after the event, summed this attitude up best with the phrase ‘Who, after the fall of Carthage could expect another war in Africa?’87

  This view sums up many commentators’ attitudes, both ancient and modern, namely, that after the Third Punic War and the Roman annexation of Carthage, Africa itself could be left alone and attention shifted to other theatres of conflict. Yet in many ways the Third Punic War itself obscures the issue. Aside from the fact that it was little more than an extended siege of one city, it overlooks the fact that by 149 BC the chief power in North Africa was the kingdom of Numidia, not the frail state of Carthage. By the time the Romans annexed Carthage in 146 BC it was little more than a coastal strip dwarfed by the entity that was Numidia.

  Thus in order to avoid falling into the same mindset that would have us see the war of 112–105 BC as coming out of the blue, and having no wider issues, we need to analyse the preceding century of North African history to gain a clearer understanding of the events that brought Rome and Numidia to war.

  North Africa during the Punic Wars

  When dealing with North Africa in the third and second centuries BC the image of Carthage looms large. What we must never forget is that Carthage was always more of a Mediterranean power than an African one. As a Phoenician maritime colony Carthage’s focus was always going to be the Mediterranean, in terms of economic and imperial activity, and this is reflected in our surviving sources. It is only during the Second Punic War that we gain our first real glimpse of the peoples and politics of the North African interior.

  Carthage itself had only a small portion of the North African continent under its direct control and had little in the way of native population. What it could call upon was the manpower of the African interior, either through a system of hegemony, or via the use of mercenaries. Greg Daly has produced the finest analysis of the Carthaginian army during the Second Punic War, which was mostly made up of allied or mercenary contingents from Spain and North Africa, under Carthaginian command.88

  Throughout the Second Punic War, Carthaginian armies fielded contingents of Numidians, as well as a number of other races covered by the terms Libyans, Mauri, Gaetulians and Liby-Phoenicians. This reveals the patchwork nature of North Africa at this time. However, we must remember that we are looking at them through the eyes of the Romans and Greeks, who had little familiarity with these peoples at that time.

  This leaves us with the initial question of just who the Numidians were. The name was that given to the region immediately to the west of the coastal region of Carthage. By the time of the Second Punic War, there appears to have been two main tribes of Numidians: the Masaesulii in the west and the Massyli in the east, both of which appeared to be tied to Carthage by alliance. We have no clear details on Carthaginian-Numidian hostilities prior to this period, but we can assume that at some previous date, Carthage had managed to assert their dominance over the tribes of the region, without annexing them. This would have been made all the easier given the hostility between the main Numidian tribes at the time.

  The Numidians f
irst come to our attention in 213, when the Masaesulian chieftain, named Syphax, began a revolt against Carthaginian overlordship. In response to this revolt the Carthaginians withdrew their commander in Spain, Hasdrubal, and a portion of their army, to deal with Syphax.89 To the Romans fighting in Spain, under the command of the Scipio brothers (Publius and Cnaeus), the benefits of opening a second front against the Carthaginians in North Africa were immediately obvious. According to Livy the Scipios dispatched three centurions to Syphax to assess his needs and offer Roman friendship. Of the three, one of them, Q. Statorius remained with Syphax in order to raise and train his army in the art of Roman infantry tactics. This Roman-trained Masaesulian army then went on to defeat a Carthaginian force, whose size is not reported, in a set-piece battle.90

  Carthage’s response to this Roman-led army was to fall back upon the Masaesulian’s traditional enemy, the Massyli. At the time the Massyli were ruled by a chief named Gala, who sent an army to join forces with the Carthaginian forces, led by his young son Masinissa, who was to figure prominently in later events. In the battle that followed Syphax and his Roman-trained army were comprehensively defeated by the Carthaginians and their Massylian allies. Livy lists Syphax’s casualties at 30,000 dead, a figure which must be treated with the usual caution.91 Appian reports that the Carthaginians were now able to send Hasdrubal back to Spain, along with a larger force than the one which had been withdrawn, along with Masinissa and his Massylians.92 As Polybius reports, this result actually placed the Scipios in a worse position than they originally were before the revolt.93

  However, in the longer term the Romans had been introduced to the concept of a strong African counterbalance to the Carthaginians. This concept, however, would not have been lost on the Numidian tribes either, who could now look outside of Africa for allies against Carthage.