The Crisis of Rome Read online

  We have no evidence for the decision-making process that the Cimbri went through, only their ultimate actions, but clearly this attack on Italy represented both a change in policy and one which they had shied away from for a number of years. Having taken this decision, however, it is clear that the Cimbric leaders realized that to accomplish the invasion and settlement of Italy they needed even greater manpower, possibly due to their losses in Spain, but certainly in order to deliver a single knock-out blow to Rome. To those ends the Cimbri made contact with a number of other tribes and co-ordinated a strategy for the invasion of Italy.

  As stated earlier, the sources are too few and too confused to allow us to construct a timeline for the other tribes’ participation with the Cimbri in the years preceding 103/102 BC. It is perfectly possible that the tribes of the Teutones and Ambrones were part of the great Cimbric host all the time, but in the scenario presented here, it makes the most sense that the Cimbri, having finally decided on the great step of invading Italy, called for allies in this enterprise and that now the other, lesser, tribes appear in matters. All we have in our sources for this alliance between the tribes is one line from the Periochae of Livy.

  They [the Cimbri] returned to Gaul and in the land of the Vellocasses [Gaul] joined the Teutoni.361

  Had we Livy’s fuller account then no doubt we would have a narrative for the meeting between the tribes, the agreement to this course of action and far greater detail on the planning. As it is we have no such details. All we do have is the ultimate course of action, a two-pronged attack on Italy, with the Teutones and Ambrones attacking Italy from the northwest and the Cimbri and Tigurini attacking from the northeast.362

  Rome’s Tribal Enemies

  Before we move onto the attacks of the two armies and the battles that resulted, it would be beneficial to briefly analyse the tribes that made up this grand tribal alliance:

  i) The Cimbri

  They are the most familiar to us, having fought Rome on three previous occasions (113, 109/108 and 105), each time resulting in a greater Roman defeat. As acknowledged earlier, we have no clear evidence for why the Cimbri fought Rome on three occasions and finally invaded Italy only on the fourth campaign. A theoretical framework was put forward based on an evolution in the Cimbric attitude towards Rome, which began with them being unaware of Rome, requesting the right to settle in Italy, a desire to eliminate Roman influence from mainland Europe and finally the need to dismantle Roman control of Italy. We will never know the fine details of this planned invasion, whether an attack on Rome itself was planned or whether they intended to destroy the Roman military to such an extent that their settlement became an accepted fact. Given the events of 101 BC, when the Cimbri settled in northern Italy and did not advance on Rome, it is possible that the latter is the more likely, though again we will never know.

  ii) The Teutones

  The Teutones also hailed from the North Sea region and are mentioned by Pytheas in his voyages of that region in the 320s BC. Again the immediate tendency is to take their name, Teutones and derive the Teutonic description from it, but again we have no firm evidence whether they were German or Celtic. Evidence from nomenclature again points towards a Celtic origin. We do not know whether they were forced to migrate due to rising sea levels or some other reason, whether they travelled the same route as the Cimbri or whether they simply answered the Cimbric call for allies in their invasion of Italy.

  iii) Ambrones

  The Ambrones are even more mysterious, only appearing in our sources in this middle period of the wars. They appear to have been far less in number than either the Cimbri and Teutones and it has been speculated that they were a small allied tribe from the Zuiderzee region of Holland (now a large North Sea inlet). Festus reports that they were a Gallic tribe, displaced by rising sea levels that took up with the larger tribal movements, and seem to have been more closely affiliated with the Teutones.363

  iv) Tigurini & Toygeni

  The Tigurini and Toygeni stand out from the above named three tribes, coming from the region of Helvetia (Switzerland). They were not part of the tribal migration from the North Sea region, but invaded the region of southern Gaul for different, and now unknown, reasons. It is possible that they became swept up by the Cimbric movements through the region or that they initially acted separately from the Cimbri and saw their chance to expand their territory at their neighbours’ expense and gain plunder. By 102/101 BC, they had evidently become part of the grand alliance against Rome, though their reluctance to invade Italy perhaps showed a more pragmatic streak; certainly, they were not under the same pressures as the other tribes as they were not looking to settle. Although the Tigurini are mentioned by several sources, Strabo is the only one to mention that a lesser Helvetian tribe, the Toygeni also joined them, on their attacks on Rome.364

  v) Local Gallic Tribes

  We have already seen that a number of Gallic and Spanish tribes had taken the opportunity presented by the reversals suffered by Rome at the hands of the Cimbri to re-assert their independence. Although a number had been subdued in the shadowy campaigns of 104 and 103 BC it is possible that a number of tribes joined this two-pronged attack on Italy, though none appear in our few surviving sources.

  Thus the stage was set for a massive attack on Italy by the native tribes of Europe, one far greater than Hannibal was able to mange a century earlier. If it succeeded then Roman power would have been severely diminished if not crushed. Had Rome itself survived then it would have a new and permanent Celtic presence in North Italy, overturning several centuries of subjugation of the region. Certainly, North Italy and Gaul would have been outside of Roman power, in the short term. What the knock on effects for the rest of the Roman Empire would have been, we can only speculate. It is also possible that Rome may have ultimately overcome these disasters and incorporated these new tribes into the Roman military and political system. Such a move would have anticipated the changes that the Roman Empire underwent by 300 to 400 years and forever altered the history of Western Europe, and Western Civilization. That it didn’t ultimately rested on the shoulders of one man, Caius Marius, who had been impatiently awaiting the return of these tribal armies for more than three years.

  The Battle of Aquae Sextiae – The Prelude

  It appears that Marius was still in Italy when he heard of the advancing tribes, but moved swiftly across the Alps and met up with his army and built a fortified forward position along the Rhone, though Plutarch does not make it clear where this forward base was. Orosius, however, places Marius’ fortified camp further north at the confluence of the Isère and Rhone rivers, thus securing the Rhone valley, there to await the arrival of the tribal forces.365 Plutarch provides us with a colourful story concerning Marius’ intelligence gathering, with a young Sertorius apparently being sent undercover amongst the tribes and reporting on their movements.366

  Again there is some argument in the sources over exactly who Marius faced in the initial clash. Orosius would have it that the initial encounter was the whole combined might of the Cimbri, Teutones, Ambrones and Tigurini, whereas Plutarch has Marius facing the combined forces of the Teutones and Ambrones, the lesser of the three northern tribes.367 Of the two, Plutarch’s version is the more consistent, with the Cimbri choosing another route into Italy, and being met by another Roman army, led by Marius’ consular colleague, Q. Lutatius Catulus.

  Both Plutarch and Orosius are consistent in the fact that upon the approach of the tribal force down the Rhone valley, Marius did not move out to engage them, but remained in his fortified position on higher ground.

  Marius, now consul for the fourth time, pitched his camp near the confluence of the Isère and Rhone rivers. The Teutones, Cimbri, Tigurini and Ambrones fought continuously for three days at the Roman camp, trying by every means to dislodge the Romans from their ramparts and drive them out onto level ground.368

  They covered a large part of the plain and after pitching their camp challenged Marius to b
attle. Marius, however, paid them no heed but kept his soldiers inside their fortifications…

  But he [Marius] would station his soldiers on the fortifications by detachments, bidding them to observe the enemy, and in this way accustomed them not to fear their shape or dread their cries which were altogether strange and ferocious; and to make themselves familiar with their equipment and movements, thus in the course of time rendering what was only apparently formidable familiar to their minds from observations.369

  Despite the obvious desire of the Roman soldiers to get to grips with the enemy, Marius held them firm and remained in his defensive position, thus frustrating the Teutones/Ambrones and denying them an encounter on their terms. Furthermore, he forced them to wear down their forces attempting to dislodge him, being unwilling to leave a large Roman army in their rear.

  But the Teutones, since Marius remained where he was, attempted to take his camp by storm; many missiles however were hurled against them from the fortifications and they lost a number of their men. They therefore decided to march forward, expecting to cross the Alps unopposed. So they packed up their baggage and began to march past the Roman camp. Then, indeed, the immensity of their numbers were made evident by the length of their line and the time required for their passage; for it is said that they were six days in passing the Roman fortifications.370

  Whilst we must treat this tale with extreme scepticism, Plutarch does make his point well, for the combined force of the Teutones and Ambrones, together with their women and children apparently passed the 200,000 mark, vastly outnumbering the Romans. Once the tribesmen had marched past the Romans, Marius too broke camp and trailed them along the Rhone valley:

  Once the barbarians had passed by and begun to move forward, Marius also broke camp and followed after them, never losing contact with them and always stopping for the night close beside them, but fortifying his camps strongly and keeping difficult ground between himself and the enemy, so as to be able to pass the night in safety. So they went on until they reached a place called Aquae Sextiae.371 From here it was a short march to the Alps and it was here that Marius prepared to give battle.372

  Thus we can see that Marius kept his head, in all senses of the phrase, when he first encountered the northern tribes. Rather than rush headlong in battle with them at the time and ground of their choosing, he waited it out. Certainly, it would have been unpopular with his soldiers, but he could see the benefits of both assessing and frustrating the enemy and fighting at his time of choosing on ground that favoured the Romans. Furthermore, having been positioned in the region for nearly two years, he would have had plenty of time to choose ground that favoured him. If that created the impression in the tribes’ minds of a Roman reluctance to fight or cowardice then all the better to lull the enemy into a false sense of security.

  Certainly, Marius had chosen his ground well; Aquae Sextiae was a wide plain by the river, which sloped steeply upwards, covered in woodland (see diagram). Marius chose to occupy the higher ground, overlooking the tribes, with the river behind them. The only drawback to this position was that it placed the tribesmen between his men and the sources of fresh water, which both Plutarch and Orosius comment on. Both note that upon Marius hearing his men’s complaints, he allegedly told them that if they wanted drinking water they would have to fight for it.373

  As Plutarch records, when the first encounter did take place, it apparently happened by accident. According to his account a group of camp servants made an attempt to get to the river to gain fresh water but stumbled on a party of Ambrones who were enjoying the hot springs at that spot. The group had been drinking and eating and were taken by surprise and not in prime fighting condition. At this point it appears that a force of Ligurians in Marius’ army broke from the main force and rushed to engage the Ambrones.374 Plutarch numbers the Ambrones at 30,000 at this particular stretch of the river.

  The Ambrones became separated by the river. Before they could form up on the other side the Ligurians had quickly rushed down on those who had been the first to cross and engaged them in hand-to-hand fighting. Then the Romans came to the aid of the Ligurians and charged down on the Ambrones from the higher ground, forced them back and routed them. Most of them herded and jostled together in the stream and were cut down on the spot and the river was filled with their blood and with the bodies of the dead. The Romans then crossed the river and finding that the enemy would not stand up to them, continued killing them as they fled right up to their camp and their wagons. Here the women came out against them, armed with swords and axes and making the most horrible shrieking, attacking both the pursuers and the pursued; the former as their enemies and the latter as the men who had betrayed them. They threw themselves into the thick of the fighting, tearing at the Romans shields with their bear hands or clutching at their swords, and though their bodies were gashed and wounded, their spirits remained unvanquished to the end. So then, as we are told, the battle at the river was brought about by accident rather than by the intention of the commander. After destroying many of the Ambrones, the Romans withdrew as night fell.375

  Thus first blood had been drawn by the Romans. Whatever the merits of the story about the clash being started by the camp servants, it is clear that the Romans had spotted a vulnerable section of the enemy force, isolated from the main body and had utilized the two key strengths they had in this position: attacking downhill and trapping the enemy with the river at their back. Certainly, the initial encounter had gone to Rome, but the Ambrones’ losses would not have altered the fact that tribes still massively outnumbered the Romans. Nevertheless, it was a morale boost for the Romans and the first success of any sort against this previously-undefeated enemy.

  Orosius also has the same story, but in a much simpler form:

  The camp servants, shouting loudly were the first to rush into the fray; then the army immediately followed. Lines of battle were quickly formed for regular combat. An engagement was fought in which the Romans were victorious.376

  An interesting variation can be found in Frontinus:

  When Marius was fighting against the Cimbrians and Teutons, his engineers on one occasion had heedlessly chosen such a site for the camp that the barbarians controlled the water supply. In response to his soldiers’ demands for water, Marius pointed with his sword towards the enemy and said ‘There is where you must get it’. Thus inspired, the Romans straightway drove the barbarians from the place.377

  The latter variation is interesting; with engineers instead of camp servants and confusion over whether it was a deliberate or accidental location, as although it states that the location was chosen by accident, Marius clearly knew that it would force his men to fight. Thus we must question whether the elaborate story in Plutarch is a more embroidered version of events. Clearly, this initial engagement between the Romans and the Ambrones ended in a Roman victory and control of this stretch of the river.

  The Battle of Aquae Sextiae (102 BC)

  Nevertheless, Orosius goes on to tell us that the main battle was fought on the fourth day, presumably since the Romans had arrived and camped.378 This elapse of time was crucial to Marius, who drew up a careful battle plan utilizing the terrain to his advantage, though he had possibly already chosen the ground in the previous few years. The battle that followed was the first one that had been fought on Roman terms and after due consideration, rather than having been rushed into.

  As can be seen from the diagram, Marius occupied the higher ground, with tribesmen in the plain below. To engage the Romans they would have to attack uphill and be funnelled towards them by the nature of the slopes and the wood on them. Thus at a stroke Marius went a great way to negating the vastly superior numbers of the enemy. They could not easily surround or flank him and the funnelling effect meant that when the two sides clashed, far fewer tribesmen would be able to engage the Romans. Marius further used the terrain to his advantage by secretly deploying a force of 3,000 legionaries, under the command of M. Claudius Marcellus, on th
e side of the hill under the cover of the wood, with orders not to reveal themselves until battle had commenced and then attack the enemy in the rear, once they had passed.

  X. The Battle of Aquae Sextiae (102 BC), Stage 1

  XI. The Battle of Aquae Sextiae (102 BC), Stage 2

  Marius’ plan hinged on the tribesmen taking the bait and attacking his position uphill, rather than waiting until the battlefield was more favourable. If the enemy had refused to fight and moved on to find flatter ground, which favoured their vastly-superior numbers, then he would have been undone.

  Plutarch himself notes that the tribesmen rashly attacked the Romans, rather than waiting:

  he [Marius] led out at daybreak and drew up in front of the camp, and sent his cavalry out into the plain. The Teutones seeing this, could not wait for the Romans to come down and fight with them on equal terms, but quickly and angrily armed themselves and charged uphill.379

  Thus Marius played on the tribes’ frustration at his previous unwillingness to fight and at his ambush a few days before to force them into a rash action, using his cavalry as bait. Furthermore, the uphill charge also favoured the Roman method of initial assault with the pilum.