The Crisis of Rome Page 15
Thus, on one occasion he had threatened to imprison the consuls over a law which technically favoured the people, though would have been obscure to many, whilst on the other he blocked what would have been a popular grain distribution law. Although we have no other information to assess these actions on, it does show a certain opportunism. What is clear is that, in the short term, there was little electoral advantage as he is reported to have failed to be elected to either the Curule or Plebeian Aedileships (though these were highly competitive positions, given the low number of places).270
However, Marius was able to bounce back in 116 when he secured election to the Praetorship for 115 at the first attempt, albeit in last place. A prosecution for bribery soon followed his election, though he mange to secure acquittal.271 Such prosecutions were the norm, especially in tight elections and against the lowest ranking successful candidate. To a novus homo such as Marius, a Praetorship was a major achievement and ranked him as a rising star. Whilst it may be a coincidence that his election coincided with that of a Metellus as consul and another as censor (see Appendix IV), it appears that he had again been sponsored by the Metelli, having patched up any rift caused by his actions in 119 BC. An uneventful Praetorship was followed by an equally uneventful governorship of Hispania Ulterior (Farther Spain), where all he could claim was to have relieved the province of banditry.272 Nevertheless, it would have opened up opportunities for business contacts in the region and a certain level of profit.273
The period of 113–109 presents us with another gap in his life.274 The most obvious next step for an ex-Praetor back from his province would have been a campaign for the consulship, probably in 112 or 111 BC, but our sources are silent on this. We do know that his political connections improved via a marriage to a Roman noblewoman named Iulia, who hailed from the Iulii Caesares, tying him into one of the oldest yet obscure patrician families.275 A consequence of this marriage is that Marius became uncle to the future C. Iulius Caesar. With the marriage somewhere in the region of 113–110, it has been argued that he campaigned for the consulship in this period, now with additional backers, though this remains conjecture.276
In any event, by 109 BC, his career had stalled at the Praetorship and he accepted the offer by Q. Caecilius Metellus to join him in Numidia as a legate in 109 BC. Nonetheless, we must not overlook his achievements to date. From provincial aristocracy to Roman Praetor was a great achievement. He had close ties with the Metelli, Rome’s leading family and was married into the old aristocracy. The Marii were now present in Roman politics and under normal circumstances his son could look forward to taking the family to the heights of the consulship. As events turned out, however, Marius was not finished and soon developed other ideas.
Marius and the consulship of 107 BC
One key question that faces us is whether Marius had this plan in mind from the beginning of his legateship or whether he developed it when in Africa. Given his position in 109 BC, having reached the praetorship, but stalled in a bid for the consulate, and in his late forties, the best he could have hoped for was more military success and greater wealth. Despite his being in Africa throughout 109 and some of 108, it is clear that he appreciated how things had changed in Rome in the period after 110 BC. The disaster at Suthul led to the creation of the Mamilian Commission and a witchunt against prominent Senators.277 Not only were failed commanders being prosecuted, but a number of prominent anti-Gracchans also fell under its scope as well. As Farney points out, this did not merely create the atmosphere for running on an anti-Senatorial ticket, but also the opportunity, given that several men who may have expected to run for the consulship had now been removed from the picture,278 though we are not informed who Marius did actually run against, aside from his eventual colleague, L. Cassius Longinus.
It is also clear from both Sallust’s and Plutarch’s accounts that Marius had begun a long-term whispering campaign amongst elements of the Roman army and wider community in North Africa.279 When he started this is impossible to date, but it is most likely to have occurred after the Roman victory at Muthul River, when it was clear that a military victory in battle was not going to end the war. The elation that the Romans must have felt at defeating Jugurtha would have soon turned into disappointment as the war still dragged on. Sallust details two particular sections of the Roman community that were targeted by Marius: the soldiers and the traders, both of which groups would have been eager for the war to end.280 For the soldiers, a chance to return home, and for the business community, a chance to restore what had been a profitable area of trade. Furthermore, as we have already noted, Marius in particular played up to the Numidian prince Gauda, present in Metellus’ army, most likely offering him a clear chance to rule in place of Jugurtha.
It is interesting to note that once more Marius appears to have had a template for these actions in Scipio Aemilianus. Appian informs us that Scipio benefited from the soldiers serving at Carthage to send back word to their friends and relatives in Rome that he would make a better commander than the ones they were presently serving under.281 As is often the case when dealing with Marius, the shadow of his old commander Scipio Aemilianus is present.
Thus, we can see that Marius, despite being in Africa, was able to use the winter break of 109/108 to get these elements to send back word to Rome that Metellus was merely more of the same and that someone fresh would be needed. However, there is one key issue here which we must not overlook. Harbouring a desire for one last run at the consulship is understandable enough, but that would not automatically bring with it command in Numidia. Metellus had already had his command in Numidia made proconsular and thus would run at the Senate’s discretion, which given the dominant Metellan position within the Senate, would be for as long as Metellus himself wanted. Under normal circumstances foreign affairs were a matter for the Senate and it alone, though Tiberius Gracchus had infamously infringed on this right with the kingdom of Pergamum in 133 BC. Thus for Marius to be considering gaining both a consulship and the Numidian command, he must have already formulated the radical step which would grant him both: getting the people to vote him the command.
To run for the consulship on such an anti-Senatorial ticket was a bold step in itself, especially against the leading Senatorial faction, but to then propose removing their power to allocate provincial commands, even on this one occasion, was truly either genius or insanity. Luckily for him, it worked.
It is clear that Metellus was all too aware of his subordinate’s ambitions and manoeuvring against him. It also seems clear that he did not give him much hope; even if Marius could gain a consulship, then his command would have been safe, assured by the Metellan faction in the Senate. Perhaps he considered that Marius would gain a command against the northern barbarians and fare no better than any previous commander. From Plutarch’s account it appears that the condemnation of Turpillius for his role in the mutiny at Vaga was the final straw in relations between Metellus and Marius (see Chapter 5).282 Whatever the exact circumstances, Metellus reasoned that he was better off without Marius’ disruptions, which was a fair assumption at the time.
Once at Rome, Marius swung into action and ran for the consulship on a promise of ending the war, which, he argued, was being unnecessarily prolonged by either Senatorial incompetence, corruption or both. Given the atmosphere created by the Mamilian Commission and the growing threat from the north, it was a campaign which would have resonated well with the people of Rome. Furthermore, it seems that he had allies amongst the tribunes of 108, who agitated for his election, even accusing Metellus of treason at one point.283 In such a charged anti-Senatorial atmosphere, we must not forget that Marius himself had been serving senator for well over a decade at this point and probably had a number of allies there. Nevertheless, it is clear that he stressed his position as an outsider, from his Italian background to repulses at elections, which could be blamed on Roman noble jealousy. Clearly, though it must have paid to have kept his marriage alliance with the patrician Iul
ii as quiet as possible at this time.
An interesting question is how his friends, family and allies viewed this move. Although Sallust reports a particularly virulent anti-Senatorial speech made before an assembly of the people, we must exercise caution as it may be Sallust rather than Marius’ words.284 We can legitimately ask whether such a tactic, of playing to the people against your own supposed colleagues was that unique. Clearly, Tiberius Gracchus had led the way by seeming to side with the people against Senate, whilst maintaining a healthy number of allies within it. The Metelli, though powerful, were bound to have a number of opponents, who did not relish the prospect of another Metellan victory to add to their tally. Ultimately, though, the sources do not stretch this far.
It is clear though that Marius judged the public mood in Rome to perfection and was elected one of the consuls for 107 (the other being an L. Cassius Longinus). We do not know who was defeated or what Longinus’ attitude or connections in all of this were. Nevertheless, the first stage had been completed, and at fifty years of age, Marius had achieved his dream of becoming consul.
Marius as consul
We do not know what provinces had originally been assigned to Marius for 107 BC, but as Longinus gained Gaul, where he was killed fighting the Tigurini, it is likely that Marius was given Italy. We have little detail on the events that surrounded the re-assignment of the Numidian command, only that a tribune,
T. Manlius Mancinus, proposed a law (plebiscitum) to the assembly proposing that Marius be given command in Numidia and that there is no reference to any of the other nine tribunes opposing it. What the Senate made of it is unclear. Marius had run on a programme of ending the war in Numidia, yet we hear that the Senate snubbed this by re-affirming Metellus as commander shortly before it was put to a vote. Given the timing, it is probable that Marius only put it to a vote when snubbed by the Senate. Cicero presents the whole affair in a more ordered light.285
At a stroke Marius had utilized the theory of popular sovereignty that underpinned the unwritten Roman constitution (though usually buried very deep). The assemblies could vote on whatever they liked regardless of Senatorial prerogative. Marius now placed the military commands in the hands of the tribunes, a step far greater than either of the Gracchi in this respect, though one which had a forebear, if not direct precedent, in Scipio Aemilianus’ actions over the Numantine command in 134 BC (see Chapter 1). Nevertheless, such an outright move was an important and deadly precedent; one which sparked-off the First Civil War in 88 BC and was utilized with great skill by Pompey in later years. Yet, the whole incident is missing from Plutarch’s account.
What Marius did next was just as important, but far more contentious historically. Both Sallust and Plutarch agree that Marius determined to raise fresh forces in order to enlarge the army in Numidia and end the war with a surge. Sallust reports that he called for more troops from Rome’s allies and clients across the Mediterranean, corroborated by the fragments of Diodorus, which provide us with an excellent insight into this process. Diodorus add that he requested military aid from Nicomedes of Bithynia.286 Nicomedes initially refused on the grounds that large numbers of his people had been enslaved by the Roman tax collectors from Asia. This resulted in a decree banning the enslavement of any citizen of an allied state, which was to have its own consequences. Whilst Nicomedes’ excuse can rightly be treated as dubious, this incident does show that Rome had to bargain from a position of weakness for help from her allies.
As well as reinforcements from overseas, Sallust informs us that he recruited a number of men from Latium and initiated a programme of recruiting veterans back into the army.287 However, all of these methods of recruiting fresh forces are eclipsed, at least in the ancient sources, as well as a number of modern ones, by the report in both Sallust and Plutarch that Marius initiated the process of recruiting troops from the poorest classes of Roman society, those without land. This has become the most infamous of Marius’ military reforms, the alleged abolition of the land qualification for military service. This issue is paradoxically one of the most important in Roman history, whilst being of minimal impact in the short-term analysis of the war. For those reasons it will be analysed and discussed more fully in a later section on Marius’ military reforms (Chapter 11). For now we can content ourselves with the fact that Marius engaged in a number of recruiting methods designed to bolster his forces for the upcoming campaign surge.
One important aspect about the whole recruitment issue, as noted by Evans, is the speed with which this was to be accomplished.288 Whilst he was still recruiting his infantry reinforcements Marius sent a legate, A. Manlius, to Africa to prepare for his arrival and left Italy whilst another legate, L. Cornelius Sulla, was still recruiting the cavalry reinforcements. Clearly, he wished to make as early a start as possible in the campaign against Jugurtha, which is hardly surprising given that he was elected on a mandate of a swift end to the war. Furthermore, he had seen how much time had been lost from the 109 campaign during the handover between commanders, nor did he know how well Metellus would take the news of his being replaced by his deputy.
The Campaigns of 107 and 106 BC.
When trying to assess the Marian campaigns of 107 and 106 BC, we are faced with two problems presented by our surviving sources. The first one is the apparent absence of any detail of the events between Jugurtha’s invasion of Numidia in late 108 BC and the arrival of Marius in late 107 BC. Furthermore, not only is there an absence of detail, but Sallust’s narrative picks up where it left off, giving us the impression that whilst events at Rome were taking place, events in Numidia were frozen until Sallust turns his attention to them once more. The second problem concerns the merging of the campaigns of 107 and 106 BC into one, sandwiched between two sieges at opposite ends of Numidia.
If we are to understand the events that occurred, then these two problems must be explored first. As 108 BC drew to a close, Jugurtha had invaded Numidia at the head of a ‘grand alliance’ of Mauri and Gaetulians and was threatening to undo the Roman achievements to date. Sallust then breaks off his campaign narrative for the election of Marius and the recruitment of his new army, which would have taken at least the first half of 107 BC. His narrative resumes, where he left off, yet screams the following question: What was Jugurtha doing in the months when Sallust is captivated by events in Rome? It is almost as if Jugurtha freezes where he is and waits patiently for the domestic situation in Rome to work itself out. This is always an issue in this period of Roman history, when our sources are far more concerned with domestic events than foreign affairs.
Upon his arrival in Africa, Marius formally took command of the Roman army there. As mentioned previously, he did so from P. Rutilius Rufus as Q. Caecilius Metellus apparently refused to meet with Marius, which is hardly surprising given the circumstances, Marius having usurped his command. Thus we apparently find the Roman army still in the province of Africa half way through 107 BC. Whilst it was normal for them to withdraw from Numidia during winter, it appears that their break continued throughout the early part of 107, whilst waiting for a change of commander, a situation exacerbated by the enmity between Metellus and Marius. Furthermore, this coincided with a renewed Jugurthan invasion of Numidia, which aside from an unknown number of garrisoned towns and cities was open to him. Once again, it appears that the Roman domestic political situation cost them crucial momentum in the war.
Therefore, it was almost as if the clock had been turned back and the war had to begin afresh. Yet although the situation in 107 may superficially resemble that of 111 and 109 BC there were significant differences. The primary one is that the Numidians had already been defeated in battle. Jugurtha himself may not have accepted this fact, but it is clear that the country and people as a whole had, hence Jugurtha’s reliance on an army of Gaetulians. Numidian armies had been easily defeated by Roman armies, and their cities occupied and in some cases laid waste. Nor was this a Roman war of conquest, but rather a war focussed primarily upon the
figure of the king. The plotting amongst the Numidian nobles reveals that they saw Jugurtha as the key obstacle to peace in the kingdom. This was further exacerbated by the presence of a clear rival to Jugurtha on the Roman side, namely his half-brother Gauda. Here was a Numidian prince of the house of Masinissa, who was allied to the Romans and with the apparent full backing of the new Roman commander Marius.
Thus, the war against Numidia had effectively been won. For the rest of the war it was to be relegated to merely being the battleground for two invading armies, the Romans from the east and the Mauri and Gaetulians from the west. All that Jugurtha could call on was the support of a few garrisoned forts and handful of towns still loyal to him. Though as had already been seen, loyalty in a war such as this tended to be sold to the side with the nearest army. Without Numidian backing, Jugurtha was reliant on the Mauri and the Gaetulians, which contained considerable risks. The Mauri were led by their king Bocchus, who despite the marriage alliance had already shown himself to be reticent about bringing the wrath of Rome upon his own kingdom, and in short was unreliable at best. Although Jugurtha had personal command of the Gaetulians, at most they were a mercenary army and like all mercenary armies were reliant upon regular payment. Furthermore, they were operating in Jugurtha’s own country, which brought with it a host of issues concerning foraging and discipline. Finally, they had not been tested in battle against the Romans and there was no guarantee that they would fare any better than the previous Numidian armies.