The Crisis of Rome Read online

  Metellus unexpectedly appeared with his army; whereupon Jugurtha made ready and drew up his Numidians as well as time allowed. Then the battle began. Wherever the king was present in person, there was some show of resistance; everywhere else his soldiers broke and fled at the first charge. The Romans captured a considerable number of standards and arms, but few prisoners.225

  We are given no reason as to why Jugurtha gave battle. Sallust’s implication is that Metellus was able to surprise him and left him with no choice; yet given both the superior intelligence Jugurtha had access to as well as the speed of his forces compared to the Romans, this seemed unlikely. Sallust does state that Jugurtha was growing increasingly paranoid following the conspiracy of his officers and it is perhaps possible that he sought battle to restore flagging Numidian morale. Standing against this possibility, however, was the inevitable outcome, which Jugurtha must have been aware of: when faced with superior Roman infantry, the Numidians once again broke and fled.

  The other possibility is that Metellus was able to corner Jugurtha, yet the speed with which this was accomplished is baffling, given that he had spent the previous year failing to do just that. It is perhaps worth remembering that a number of Numidians had deserted to the Roman side over the winter of 108. We are not told of their rank, but given the strong possibility that they were involved in the attempted coup described above, then it is more than likely that they were a number of senior-ranking Numidians and brought with them considerable intelligence on Jugurtha’s plans. With this knowledge we can speculate that Metellus was able to finally surprise Jugurtha. Nevertheless, with the little evidence we have all we can do is speculate upon this.

  Whatever the cause of the battle, the result was clear enough. The Numidians were defeated and Jugurtha fled deeper in Numidia, taking refuge at the royal stronghold of Thala. Metellus swiftly followed up his victory with a dash to Thala in an attempt to capture the king. Despite this swift advance, Jugurtha was able to flee once more, with his children and his treasury. Nonetheless, Metellus determined to capture the stronghold and set about another siege. On this occasion the town fell after a forty-day siege. However, the gains were minimal as the town’s leading citizens fled to the royal palace, taking their treasures with them. After a feast, which included large amounts of wine, these citizens then set fire to the palace, with themselves in it, in an apparent act of mass suicide (though a drunken accident cannot be ruled out).

  Unfortunately, this is all that we know of the campaign of 108 BC, the battle and the siege, with Sallust skipping over the rest of the year, perhaps on account of there being little to report. Once again, it appears that although the Romans had defeated Jugurtha once again in 108, the war seemed to be no nearer a conclusion. On the positive side, most of Numidia now lay in Roman hands and Jugurtha was apparently on the run with only a small retinue.

  The African War

  However, it was at this point, just when he seemed to be at his lowest ebb, that Jugurtha showed his superb diplomatic and tactical abilities and pulled off a coup which resulted in a massive escalation of the war for Rome. Having been cut off from his Numidian resources, Jugurtha widened his influence and gained allies and forces from outside of Numidia, namely the Gaetulians to the south and the Mauri to the west. The Gaetulians were a collection of tribes who lived to the south of the Numidians, by the Atlas Mountains. In the few Roman sources that do mention them they are usually collected together as one race, though the reality was far more complicated.226 Sallust exhibits a typical Roman reaction to the Gaetulians when he describes them as:

  a wild and uncivilized race of men who at the time had never heard of Rome. He (Jugurtha) mustered their population in one place and gradually trained them to keep rank, follow the standards, obey orders and perform the other duties of soldiers.227

  Aside from overlooking the incredible amount of time it would have taken Jugurtha to train a barbarous people from scratch in the art of ‘western’ warfare, we have a reference from Livy that Gaetulians were to be found in Hannibal’s army and can conclude that they had long been used as mercenaries, and thus were well acquainted both with Rome and an organized form of warfare.228 Given this, we can assume that far from being a case of Jugurtha wandering out of the wilderness, as Sallust paints it, it would haven been more the case that Jugurtha’s money appealed to them.

  Further help came from the west in the form of Bocchus, King of the Mauri, a tribal people in the very northwest of Africa (Mauretania). Bocchus was related to Jugurtha by marriage and thus it seems that Jugurtha was able to appeal to family ties, liberally aided by substantial monies, to bring Bocchus to his aid.229 Furthermore, it appears that Bocchus had been snubbed by the Romans when he had approached them for a treaty of alliance at the outbreak of the war (though the date and the Roman commander are not given230. Jugurtha was also able to play upon Bocchus’ fear of the Roman intentions, with them now in control of Numidia. Such a fear may also have been a strong motivating factor in the decision of the Gaetulian tribes to follow Jugurtha.

  Thus, at a stroke, Jugurtha had gone from being a fleeing refugee to being the head of a somewhat untested two-nation African alliance against Rome. We must always be cautious in following the apparent short timescales given by our surviving sources and it is more than possible that Jugurtha had been working on these alliances for some time. Nevertheless, for Rome the situation had become potentially grave; where previously they had been facing one king, who did not have the whole support of his nation, they now faced two armies, of Gaetulians and Mauri, commanded by Jugurtha and Bocchus. This latter point has often been overlooked in the histories, with too great a focus on Jugurtha himself. Nevertheless, we must be cautious as to how reliable these new allies were to Jugurtha.

  This new hybrid force (which again we have no numbers for) then invaded Numidia and made for Cirta, the site of the siege that had initially caused the war, which by this point of 108 BC was now apparently in Roman hands, though we are not given any details about how it came to be so. By this point Metellus had turned Cirta into a temporary headquarters, housing the Roman supplies, prisoners and captured loot, perhaps for the winter.

  One major problem we have with our surviving record concerns the chronology of events.231 Sallust condenses the events in Numidia in a few short sections.232 We do not know when in the year the unnamed ‘Second Battle’ took place. Nor do we have a timescale for Jugurtha’s creation of the Gaetulian–Mauri alliance. The clear implication is that Metellus had turned Cirta into a headquarters to spend the winter, rather than evacuating Numidia once again and losing control. After the siege of Thala we are given no indication of Metellus’ activities in Numidia, and given the sudden appearance of Cirta in Roman hands, we can speculate that Metellus used this time to consolidate the Roman control of Numidia. Thus when Bocchus and Jugurtha invaded Numidia, the onset of winter was approaching.

  Metellus, aware of the advance, established a fortified camp near Cirta to await the arrival of this invading army. It was at this point that he received the unexpected news, that not only had Marius been elected to a consulship for 107 BC, but that the assembly had voted him the province of Numidia and the command against Jugurtha, overriding the Senatorial prerogative (see Chapter 7). We do not need Sallust to imagine how Metellus felt at this betrayal, to be replaced by his own deputy and, even worse, one who was a social inferior and a client. For the Roman campaign, this news could not have come at a worse time. When faced with a massive escalation of the war and an invasion by a combined Mauri-Gaetulian army, the last thing the Romans needed was to have their field commander undermined and de-motivated in such a manner.

  Metellus responded by use of diplomacy, in an attempt to break up the alliance between Bocchus and Jugurtha. He sent emissaries to Bocchus to convince him that he did not need to become an enemy of Rome or to support Jugurtha’s doomed cause. Unfortunately, Sallust’ narrative of the rest of the 108 campaign tails off at this point, with his interest
taken by events in Rome involving Marius.233 This joint attack by Bocchus and Jugurtha on Cirta fails to materialize, perhaps due to Metellus’ diplomacy making Bocchus think twice.

  When Marius arrives in Africa in 107 BC (again we are given no clear timescale), the command of the army is handed over to him by P. Rutilius Rufus, at Utica (in Roman Africa). Metellus had understandably refused to hand over command as tradition dictated. Thus by 107 BC, the Roman army was back in the Roman province of Africa, again leaving Jugurtha and Bocchus apparently in charge of Numidia. The gaps in our sources do not give us any detail of how this occurred. As far as they are concerned, Bocchus and Jugurtha suddenly stopped their attack on Cirta and sat around for six months waiting for Marius to arrive and take command of the war, and then restarted their campaigns in early to mid–107, at exactly the same point they had left off. Once again, Roman military history falls foul of the priority given to domestic politics. Had we still had the relevant books of Livy intact, this would not be the case (see Appendix V).

  Even if Bocchus had been dissuaded from attacking the Romans, Jugurtha was still in command of the Gaetulian army and Cirta made a tempting target. We are unfortunately left with a series of questions, which, for the foreseeable future, will never be answered: did Jugurtha attack Cirta or did Metellus withdraw all of his forces back to Roman Africa?

  We can perhaps find some help in the actions of Marius in the campaign of 107 BC. On the one hand we are told that Jugurtha was attacking towns in Numidia still allied to Rome, but on the other that there were numerous strongholds still in Jugurthan hands.234 It is most likely that no serious fighting took place between Metellus and Jugurtha in late 108/early 107, though whether this was the result of Jugurthan or Metellan indifference is impossible to tell. We cannot even be certain that Cirta remained in Roman hands, though this seems most likely from the later context of the campaigns of 107 BC. It is possible that Metellus left Cirta and a number of towns garrisoned and withdrew the bulk of the army back into Roman Africa. Faced with a strong Roman defence and an uncertain ally, it is also possible that Jugurtha was not able to successfully besiege Cirta and when he realized that Metellus was not going to be drawn into battle, gave up the attack and concentrated on bringing the rest of Numidia back to his rule.

  Summary – The Metellan Campaigns

  i) Rome

  In the face of it, the Metellan campaigns were an obvious success for Rome. When Metellus took command in 109 the Romans had just been defeated and humiliated and had been driven from Numidia. In the period that followed the Romans fought two pitched battles against the Numidians, at Muthul River and the so-called ‘Second Battle’, and comprehensively won both, gaining complete control of Numidia and forcing Jugurtha to flee. Yet by 107 BC the situation had, if anything, become potentially more dangerous for Rome than in 109, for two main reasons.

  Firstly, despite overwhelming military superiority, the war continued with no obvious end in sight. If anything, Jugurtha was showing the tenacity of the Romans, in the fact that every time he was defeated in battle, he raised a fresh army and continued to fight. Florus drew the parallel to Hannibal, but when Hannibal was defeated in 202 at Zama, Carthage sued for peace and he had to lay down his arms.235 As the undisputed king of Numidia, Jugurtha was able to continue the war, though as noted below his control over Numidia wavered with every defeat. Furthermore, the Roman grip on Numidia itself appeared to be tenuous. Certainly, cities such as Thala, Vaga and Cirta could be taken, by siege if necessary, but the Roman hold on them was tenuous at best, with the ever present danger of a native rebellion. Furthermore, the Roman writ of control only extended to the towns and cities they garrisoned, with the countryside uncontrolled and potentially hostile. This was especially the case when Jugurtha reverted to his guerrilla tactics. With regard to this last point the Metellan campaigns had again shown that although superior in battle, the Roman army was not able to win a war when the enemy refused to come to terms and fought on.

  As noted earlier, the war that had broken out centred on the figure of Jugurtha himself, even if there were sound strategic reasons for wanting to limit the power of Numidia. Until he came to terms, was killed or captured, the war would continue. Given the strains at Rome both domestically and with regard to the situation in the north, the Senate needed a speedy conclusion to the war. When, after eighteen months, it looked as though Metellus was not able to deliver this result, these tensions spilled over and saw the extraordinary election of Marius to the consulship and then the command in Numidia.

  The second reason was the rise of the Mauri-Gaetulian alliance, which saw a significant escalation of the war. Instead of fighting the Numidians, who had been shown to be militarily of poorer quality, the Romans now faced a coalition of the three main North African races, the Numidians, the Mauri and the Gaetulians, which, if unchecked, threatened Rome’s domination of the North African region. Furthermore, at the same time as Rome faced this alliance, the issue of instability of command was raised once more, with Metellus being undermined by his deputy, and stripped of the command altogether. Although the sources are not clear, this may have resulted in the Roman army failing to engage this new invading North African army and retiring to Roman territory.

  Nevertheless, we have to ask ourselves, how much of this situation was down to Metellus. In just eighteen months he had restored Roman discipline and shown the superior Roman military ability in two set-piece battles. Jugurtha had been expelled from Numidia and the country was under nominal Roman suzerainty. Certainly, Jugurtha had re-invaded at the head of a new pan-African army, but this did not mean that either the Mauri or the Gaetulians would prove to be any more of a challenge in battle than the Numidians were.

  Thus, it can be argued that the position Metellus left in the beginning of 107 BC was far stronger than the one which he had inherited two years earlier. That the situation had the potential to become worse for Rome did not mean that it would, especially given the Roman military superiority in set-piece battles. Nonetheless, there were no clear signs that the war would come to a speedy conclusion and for that Metellus lost his command.

  ii) Jugurtha

  For Jugurtha the campaigns of 109–108 BC had been a clear setback. During the winter of 110 he is reported to have been on the offensive, engaging in wars to enlarge his kingdom, which may have included subduing the Gaetulians, having defeated and humiliated the Roman army. By the summer of 108, he had been defeated twice in battle and been driven from his kingdom. His campaigns show both his individual brilliance as a commander and the inherent weaknesses of his position. Both at Muthul River and Thala, he forced the Romans to fight on his terms, using his tactics on his ground. Yet this tactical brilliance was not matched by the quality of the men under his command, who proved to be no match for a Roman legion and usually fled when faced by one at close quarters.

  His leadership skills were ably demonstrated by the ‘grand alliance’ he created in 108 BC, as joint head of an army of Gaetulians and Mauri. Yet, if he could not rely on his own countrymen, what chance did he have with mercenaries and untrustworthy allies? Both the Gaetulians and Mauri had been weaker than the Numidians at the start of the war; if the Numidians were no match for Rome then would these new allies prove to be any better?

  Nevertheless, his tenacity in continuing to fight was both a result of his character and his desperate position. His actions both at Rome, but especially at Suthul, had ensured that Roman public opinion would brook no peace terms that did not end in his being paraded though Rome. Furthermore, his own position in Numidia was weak, undermined by the seemingly-inevitable Roman victory. The aborted coup of 109/108 BC also showed the weakness of his grip on Numidia, with most Numidians realizing that the war, and all of its associated misery would only end with him killed or captured. If his own countrymen were not trustworthy then the Gaetulians and Mauri were less so. Bocchus had already been open to negotiating with the Romans and the Gaetulians were mercenaries at best and would not b
e reliable following their first defeat.

  Thus as 107 opened, Jugurtha had no option but to keep fighting and had just one glimmer of hope of emerging from the war intact. Defeating the Romans was logistically impossible; they had a far superior military and a near-endless supply of men and commanders. Whilst the Senate may have seen the logic of coming to a negotiated settlement with him, the Roman people, however, were another case. From the outset, this war had been driven by Roman public opinion, usually manifesting itself in the actions of the tribunes. By 107 BC this had resulted in an outsider being elected consul and the Senate having their prerogative of selecting Rome’s military commanders stolen away from them. It is clear that with the circumstances as they were and Jugurtha being the focus of the wrath of the Roman people, peace was impossible. Yet if the circumstances changed and this war became an unnecessary distraction in the face of a greater threat, then peace may indeed have been possible.

  Chapter 6

  The Northern Wars: Victory in Thrace, Defeat in Gaul (111–107 BC)

  Before we turn our attention to Marius, we must first consider the events that had occurred on Rome’s northern borders during the period of 111–107 BC, to see how Rome was faring in the Northern Wars. When we last examined the situation, in the northeast the Scordisci had been driven from Greece and Roman armies were operating in Thracian territory, whereas in the northwest, Roman forces had been destroyed at the Battle of Noreia.

  The Cimbric Wars II (109–108 BC)

  Between the years 113 to 109 we have no trace of the Cimbri. The surviving Roman sources simply dismiss them as having continued their wanderings once more. Yet to dismiss them so easily diminishes their role as a genuine opponent for Rome, some mythical bogeymen that appear out of nowhere every few years. If anything, the Battle of Noreia merely confirmed an existing pattern for the Cimbri, of finding a hostile reception wherever they went. Even though on this occasion they were victorious, the Cimbri apparently decided that the region was unsuitable for peaceful settlement or would require too great a war to be worth their while, and continued their westward quest, which would take them into the fertile regions of Gaul. We do not know their route, or whether these years were a continued migration or whether they found somewhere to settle, even temporarily. By 109 BC, however, the Cimbri had begun to penetrate the Rhone valley and once again appeared on the fringes of Roman influence.