The Crisis of Rome Page 10
This is all we know about the military events of 111 BC. A number of other sources briefly mention the campaign, but nearly all omit even these basic details. However, we should not follow Sallust’s lead and dismiss this campaign. In both military and political terms, Bestia was pursuing a sound policy. He had with him an inexperienced army, operating in a region that no Roman soldier had fought in for a generation (since the Third Punic War). Thus, it was imperative that they be blooded in combat without being put at risk, hence some basic siege operations to build up experience and confidence, as well as allowing the opportunity for quick booty. For the purpose of the expedition the sacking of Numidian towns was an excellent method of punishing the Numidian people for the transgressions of Jugurtha. Even Sallust, who seems to have been loath to say anything good about Bestia, admires the swiftness of the initial campaigning.
Following these initial attacks, Jugurtha adopted a familiar tactic and opened negotiations with Bestia. It is here that Sallust immediately condemns Bestia and his deputy Scaurus, a condemnation that has echoed throughout all of the surviving sources. Sallust immediately saw this as nothing more than blatant bribery and lambasts Bestia and Scaurus thus:
the consul’s mind, demoralized as it was by avarice, was easily turned from its purpose. Moreover, he took Scaurus as an accomplice in all his designs: for although at first, even after many in his own party had been seduced, Scaurus had vigorously opposed the king, a huge bribe turned him from honour and virtue to criminality.189
As pointed out earlier, negotiating with the Romans was a sound policy for Jugurtha. Despite the Roman invasion of Numidia, full disaster could be averted by submitting to Rome and doing penance for the massacre at Cirta. The only irreversible act would be to engage the Romans in battle. Thus we hear of no Numidian military activity at this time. If some cities had to be sacrificed to the Roman appetite for glory, it was a small price to pay for keeping his head and his throne.
However, given the earlier Roman demand for an unconditional surrender, what can be said of Rome’s attitude towards fresh negotiations? Leaving aside Sallust’s view that negotiating with Jugurtha was nothing more than blatant corruption, it can be argued that Bestia was actually acting in Rome’s best interests. In the first few months of campaigning, Jugurtha had shown no sign of engaging the Roman forces, which raised the clear prospect of a long-drawn-out desert war with the enemy refusing to give battle. This was exactly the type of situation which the Senate would have hoped to avoid. If Jugurtha could be humbled by a show of force and be publicly brought back into the Roman fold, then there was no reason for the war to continue; Roman power and Roman honour would have been satisfied. This is not to say that monies did not change hands between the two parties, merely that it was not the cause of the negotiations and the treaty that followed.
These negotiations led to an armistice and then a settlement. ‘Armistice’ is a bit of a misnomer given that to date the war had been nothing more than the Romans attacking and plundering towns near the Numidian/Roman African border. The price of the armistice was the gift of grain from the Numidians to the invading Roman troops, which was both logistically astute and an obvious token of submission. With that achieved, Jugurtha appeared before a Roman council of war, formed from amongst the senior commanders of the Roman army, and made his offer of submission and surrender. In practical terms this included thirty elephants, a number of cattle and horses and an amount of silver.
Thus the war appeared to be over in less than a year. Numidia was at peace and Bestia was able to return to Rome to hold the elections for the consuls of 110 BC. This was slightly unusual, but his colleague Scipio, who had been assigned Italy as his province had died and we hear of no suffect consul being elected in his place. For Bestia, the war had been an apparent success; his army had launched a punitive attack on an errant ally and brought him back into line with the submission of the king and the payment of an appropriate indemnity. Thus it was short, successful and profitable. Whether there had been further secret donations provided by Jugurtha, we will never know. Nevertheless, given Bestia’s probable instructions for the ‘war’, he had achieved them admirably.
Matters of War and Peace in Rome
However, it was at this point that the change in Roman domestic politics became apparent. Once again the tribune C. Memmius stirred up the urban populace by claiming that this settlement, which from a logical point of view had achieved the limited Senatorial aims, was a betrayal of the Roman people and the result of Senatorial corruption. Unsurprisingly, this matter is given in great detail by Sallust, who reports what purports to be Memmius’ speech on the matter.190
Having agitated the urban populace into believing that this was a dishonourable peace, achieved by foreign bribery, Memmius once again usurped the Senate’s control of foreign policy and had the popular assemblies pass a plebiscitum ordering the praetor L. Cassius to go to Numidia to bring Jugurtha back to Rome to give evidence against the nobles accused of accepting his ‘bribes’. Thus, the war against Numidia and the peace negotiations were put on hold and Jugurtha, who had been declaimed as an enemy of Rome by Memmius, was now being called as a witness to substantiate his accusations. Thus it is clear that foreign affairs were now clearly at the mercy of the domestic clashes between the Senate and other sections of the population. It was a clear indicator of things to come and though Memmius was the first to manipulate the Numidian crisis for his own ends, he was not to be the last.
Sallust reports the effect that this unorthodox delay had on the Roman army in Numidia, with reports of desertion, attacks on the locals and the sale of the donated elephants back to the Numidians.191 Once again it appears that the much-vaunted Roman military discipline was breaking down. What effect the arrival of Cassius had on Jugurtha we can only speculate. The Romans had declared war on him, invaded Numidia, attacked his towns, forced his surrender and were now calling him as a witness in a corruption hearing. The latter placed him in a highly awkward position. He clearly needed both the Senate and People to ratify his peace treaty, but could not afford to antagonize either of them. Certainly, even if there was bribery, he could not implicate his own allies within the Senate.
Fortunately for Jugurtha, this situation was salvaged when a tribunician colleague of Memmius, C. Babeius, utilized his right to intervene (intercessio) to prevent the king from speaking. As is to be expected, Sallust attributes this intervention to a large Jugurthan bribe, but in reality there were a number of senators who would have not wished potentially-damning evidence to be given. Thus the year ended with stalemate, both in military terms in Numidia and political terms in Rome, with one being beholden to the other.
This uneasy peace between Rome and Numidia was shattered by one act: the murder of a Numidian prince, Massiva, who was reportedly being touted as a rival candidate to Jugurtha for the Numidian throne. Massiva was a son of the Numidian co-regent, Gulassa, brother of King Micipsa, and thus a cousin to Jugurtha. We know nothing about his age or upbringing, but he had clearly been excluded from Micipsa’s plans for the succession. Sallust tells us that during the Numidian Civil War he was a supporter of Adherbal, who had fled to Rome after the latter’s murder. With war between Rome and Jugurtha, attention turned to him as a possible new co-regent of Numidia or a straight replacement for Jugurtha.192
These hopes were apparently fostered by Sp. Postumius Albinus, who was elected as one of the consuls of 110 BC and who had received Numidia in the lot for provinces. Here we again see the drawback of Rome’s annual system of rotating command. L. Calpurnius Bestia had successfully led a punitive campaign and brought about Jugurtha’s submission. His successor, eager for glory himself and without an approved peace between Rome and Numidia, appeared to be eager to renew the war.
It appears that as Massiva had been in Rome since 112 BC, and it is likely that he had been advocating his own elevation to either the sole or joint kingship for some time, what he now had was consular backing for this desire. Sallust
reports that a proposal making Massiva king of Numidia (though whether this was as sole or joint king is unclear) was apparently in preparation to be brought before the Senate.193 Certainly, Massiva’s elevation would have allowed the Senate to return to their earlier settlement and divide Numidia once more, most probably with Massiva receiving Adherbal’s kingdom of Eastern Numidia.
This action or even rumoured action would have placed Jugurtha in a terrible position. If he did nothing, at best he would return to the position of 118 BC, and at worst he would be ousted altogether. Yet he had spent months in Rome witnessing the chaos that Rome’s political system had descended into. Therefore, he took a gamble and ordered a subordinate (Bomilcar) to arrange the murder of Massiva. The murder succeeded, but the gamble failed when the assassin was caught and confessed, with Bomilcar duly being put on trial. Here Jugurtha made his final fateful decision, and chose to protect his subordinate by secreting him back to Numidia. This proved to be the final break with the Senate who ordered Jugurtha out of Italy and a renewal of hostilities. As Jugurtha left Sallust has him looking back and saying, ‘A city for sale and doomed to speedy destruction if it finds a purchaser,’ though this is more likely to have been Sallust’s view rather than Jugurtha’s.
The Campaign of 110 BC – Renewal of War and Roman Disaster
Roman Aims
With the breakdown of negotiations and the blatant act of treachery committed in their own midst, the Senate would have had no option but to be committed to a full-scale war in Numidia with the aim of removing Jugurtha. Despite Massiva’s assassination there were enough members of the Numidian ruling family from whom a pliable client-king could be found. Thus it was only in 110 BC, nearly eighteen months after war had been declared, the Roman state was fully committed to the war.
The Roman Commander – Sp. Postumius Albinus
The new Roman commander hailed from a patrician family which had a record of consulships dating back to the fourth century BC and a distinguished (if unspectacular) military record. It is clear from his actions in Rome that he was committed to a war in Numidia, which he would have been seen as an opportunity for personal military glory. Thus the war now had a fully committed Roman commander with clear aims.
Jugurthan Aims
For Jugurtha, the murder of Massiva and facilitating the escape of the organiser of the plot from Roman justice had been a step too far. This was a clear affront to Roman dignity and one which would have been difficult to justify. Yet even at this point, he would have had a clear sense that he still had a number of factors in his favour. The terrain suited the fast ‘hit and run’ type of warfare favoured by the Numidians, with their light cavalry. Furthermore, knowing the Roman military as he did, it was clear that he would have to avoid a full-scale pitched battle and frustrate the enemy. Albinus’ command was only for a year and then Jugurtha would be facing a fresh Roman consul, who may have been more open to negotiation/bribery (at least in Jugurtha’s mind).
The Campaign of 110 BC
Postumius arrived in Numidia to take charge of the army stationed there, along with fresh pay and supplies, but no fresh troops. We are not told what measures he took to restore discipline, but it seems unlikely there were major changes given the events that followed. Once again Sallust is light on the details of the campaign of 110 BC, but what is clear is that it followed the familiar pattern of vigorous thrusts from Postumius’ forces being met with a Numidian refusal to give battle.194 It can be said that Jugurtha copied the classic Roman ‘Fabian tactic’ of refusing to give battle when faced with a superior fighting force.195 At the same time as refusing to give battle, Jugurtha continued with his offers to negotiate a settlement, whilst harrying the Roman forces with lightning raids. These would have served a two-fold purpose: to frustrate the Roman forces and convince them that there would be no military solution to the war, whilst bolstering the morale of his own forces, showing them how slow and ineffectual the Roman method of warfare was.
Again, here we have a perfect example of the flaws in the Roman military machine; when faced with a static enemy, such as an opposing army or a town, the Roman heavy infantry had no equal. When faced with a guerrilla army, be it in the forests of Spain or the deserts of North Africa, the Romans had little response. The recent defeats suffered at the hand of the Scordisci and Cimbri highlighted the Roman vulnerability to foes that did not give battle in the same manner.
For Postumius it was a frustrating campaign, with the Numidians refusing to give battle and prevaricating over submission. This in turn resulted in dissatisfaction in Rome about the time it was taking to finish what was meant to be an easy war. As the year passed by, we can easily understand Postumius’ growing frustration, knowing that with the election of fresh consuls, he would lose his chance for victory and his consulship would end in relative failure. Obviously frustrated and feeling the pressure from Rome, Postumius left Africa to conduct the consular elections for 109 BC, leaving his forces in camp under the command of his brother A. Postumius Albinus.
However, Spurius’ absence turned out to be longer than expected, again resulting from trouble in Rome with tribunes. This time it was P. Licinius Lucullus and L. Annius who were attempting to seek re-election to the tribunate, which, whilst not illegal, was strenuously opposed by many who sought to avoid entrenched tribunes and a return to the days of the Gracchi.196 In the deadlock that followed, all elections for 109 BC were delayed, with Sp. Postumius remaining in Rome. Once again Roman military activities in Numidia became beholden to domestic political infighting, centred on the tribunes.
The Battle of Suthul
In his brother’s absence, Aulus Postumius saw an opportunity to restore his family’s glory (and his own) and planned a knockout blow at Jugurtha by moving to attack his treasury, at the town of Suthul, during the winter of 110/109 BC.197 However, the town’s defences proved to be formidable and the initial assault failed, with the Roman army digging in for a winter siege. It was at this point that Jugurtha made a fateful decision and one which changed the course of the war. Abandoning his previous policy of not engaging the Romans in battle, and seeing the opportunity of a weak Roman army, led by an inexperienced commander, he decided to commit his forces fully to the war and attack the Roman forces.
In secret, he amassed his own forces and marched them to a position near Suthul, then sent emissaries to Aulus Postumius promising a favourable settlement. Using these promises he got Aulus to break his siege of Suthul and lead his army into following Jugurtha’s. Why Aulus did this will never be known. The most plausible explanation is that he shadowed Jugurtha’s army, hoping that if the offer of a settlement proved to be false, he could at least engage Jugurtha’s army in battle. Thus Aulus allowed himself to be led straight into a trap. The key problem for the Romans here being that the most experienced Roman commander was leading the Numidian army not the Roman one. As the two armies shadowed each other, Jugurtha put his knowledge of the Roman soldiers to good use and sent agents amongst apparently disaffected Roman forces. Such disaffection is easy to understand, given that they were now coming to the end of a second year with little to show for their efforts, apart from a collapsed peace treaty of the previous year and another year spent chasing shadows around the desert.
At a set time (again we are not told when), Jugurtha sprung his trap. As the Romans made camp for the night, Jugurtha was able to secretly surround them with a large Numidian force, catching them unawares. From Sallust’s description the Numidian attack on the Roman camp turned into an utter Roman rout; unprepared, inexperienced and suffering from a number of either pre-planned or spontaneous desertions, Aulus’ army fled from the camp with little resistance, seeking shelter in the nearby hills.198 The attack was a spectacular victory for Jugurtha who had routed a Roman invading army with minimum casualties. Once again he stuck to his policy of not meeting the Romans in open battle and defeated a force of 40,000 Romans (if we are to believe the figures provided by Orosius199, though we are not given Roman ca
sualties.
The next day, Jugurtha sent an emissary to Aulus Postumius and made clear his terms. In return for their lives, Aulus would agree to evacuate all Roman forces from Numidia and the survivors of his army would have to pass under the yoke as a sign of submission. Faced with little alternative and no real chance of resisting, Aulus agreed to the shameful terms and agreed a treaty with Jugurtha. Thus the winter of 110/109 BC saw the complete defeat of the Roman invasion of Numidia and a Roman commander agreeing to a unconditional surrender to Jugurtha rather than the other way around.
Summary of the Early Campaigns – Rome
Although we posses little detail of the military campaigns of the first two years, there can be no denying that the Romans had a poor start to the war. A number of factors can be seen throughout these first two years. First and foremost is that Rome appears to have had no clear plan of what they were hoping to achieve in the war and this is reflected in their military activities. This lack of direction was a direct result of the circumstances surrounding the outbreak of the war; was Jugurtha an enemy of Rome or an errant ally?
At no point did either Calpurnius Bestia or the Postumii Albinii treat the war as though they intended to defeat Jugurtha and ensure his capture, as they would with an outright enemy king. All three commanders acted as though they were on punitive expeditions designed to bring Jugurtha to heel. The people, or at least a section of them stirred by the tribune Memmius, may have wanted an aggressive war with Jugurtha, but the Senate did not. Jugurtha and Numidia had always been allies of Rome and in the Senate’s view there were more pressing issues. In 111 BC Jugurtha appeared to have agreed with the Roman view and soon negotiated himself into an armistice. After the events of 110 BC in Rome, the matter became more serious, but as the disaster with Aulus Postumius showed, Jugurtha was still not seen as an implacable enemy of Rome. With the defeat and humiliation of a Roman army however, this was bound to change.